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U.S. Military Drones 
By Travis Eiswerth, Class of 2018 
Summary 
 Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are large remote-
controlled aircrafts capable of carrying approximately 2 tons 
of military equipment, supplies, and can be armed with 
weaponry.  Many can fly over 3500 miles per flight at 
heights up to 50,000-feet.  Increasingly used in the “War on 
Terrorism” since the attacks on 9/11, the US continues to use 
UAVs to attack terrorists in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, 
Somalia, Syria, and others.1   
Issue/Problem 
 There has been a reasonable amount of backlash 
towards the Obama administration for increases made in the 
utilization of drones in military operations.  Some opponents 
think that this violates international military/war laws.2  
Others believe there is not enough transparency in the drone 
                                                 
1 Drones. (2015). ProCon.org. Retrieved from 
http://drones.procon.org/#background 
2 Martin, K. (2016). Are U.S. drone strikes legal? A guide to the 
relevant legal questions. Center for American Progress. Retrieved from 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2016/04/01/13
4494/are-u-s-drone-strikes-legal/  
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program.  Some go as far as say that drones kill more 
innocent civilians than they kill terrorists, therefore, the costs 
far outweigh the benefits.3 Others argue that a drone 
program is an essential part of an ever-modernizing world. 
Many countries are also utilizing these new technological 
methods and the United States needs to stay up to date with 
the technology. There is also an argument that the drone 
program is very effective at disrupting terrorist networking 
bases. Finally, drones keep our soldiers safe and the drone 
program is relatively inexpensive compared to the money 
spent on the military.4   
Background 
 The very first drone-like weapons used date back to 
1849 when the Habsburg Austrian Empire launched 200 
pilotless balloons that were strapped with bombs to combat 
against citizens involved in a revolution in Venice. Again, 
balloons that had bombs connected to them were used by 
Japan against the United States in 1944. The first electronic 
drones were designed by the U.S. Navy for intelligence 
gathering missions during the Vietnam War.5 
 The first attack that was carried out using a military 
drone by the United States occurred in 2002 in Yemen. The 
                                                 
3 Zenko, M. (2013). Reforming U.S. drone strike policies. Council 
Special Report No. 65, pg. 16. Retrieved from 
file:///C:/Users/Travis/Downloads/Drones_CSR65.pdf 
4 The Choices Programs. (2015). Debating U.S. Drone Policy. 
Choices.edu. Retrieved from 
http://www.choices.edu/resources/twtn/twtn-drones.php 
5 Earliest Drones. (2015). ProCon.org. Retrieved from 
http://drones.procon.org/#background 
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U.S. drone fired a hellfire missile at a car, blowing the car 
up, and killing all six people inside the car. One of the six 
people in the car was a U.S. citizen, but another one of the 
six people was a senior al Qaeda operative that was wanted 
for the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000.6  
 Drone bombings had increased over the next several 
years. Under President Bush, there was an average of one 
drone bombing every forty days. The frequency of bombings 
have increased vastly, averaging one drone bombing every 
four days.7  Since the drone program was first created, there 
have been advances in the drones technology. All of these 
drones are flown for the U.S. government by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC).8 
Pre-existing Policies 
 As of now, no real policy exists for the use and 
operation of United States Military Drone Programs. There 
are only two restrictions on the programs come from Article 
51 of the UN Charter.  The first of those restrictions is the 
permission of the state/country where the attacks are taking 
place must give permission to interfere.  The second is the 
                                                 
6 Background. (n.d.). The strategic effects of a lethal drones policy. 
American Security Project. Retrieved from 
http://www.americansecurityproject.org/asymmetric-operations/the-
strategic-effects-of-a-lethal-drones-policy/ 
7 Background. (n.d.). The strategic effects of a lethal drones policy. 
American Security Project. Retrieved from 
http://www.americansecurityproject.org/asymmetric-operations/the-
strategic-effects-of-a-lethal-drones-policy/ 
8 CIA and JSOC Drone Operation. (2015). Drones. ProCon.org. 
Retrieved from http://drones.procon.org/#background 
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target state or a group within it has to have acted aggressively 
toward the targeting state.9  If either of these two things 
happen, the attacking state can use drones attacks without 
permission by the state being attacked.   
 What does exist is a written list of policy standards 
and procedures that comes from the Obama administration 
and the White House that looks at the “rigorous” process for 
reviewing counterterrorism operations before they can be 
approved.  Most drone operations come in the form of 
counterterrorism or intelligence operations.  The document 
stresses the importance to the White House and the 
Counterterrorism operatives that its main priority is 
conducting these operations “lawfully.”10 
 The first section of the written document of policy 
standards and procedures says that the United States has a 
preference for capturing a suspected terrorist. If the U.S. is 
able to successfully capture and interrogate a terrorist 
suspect, then more intelligence can be acquired through 
questioning than just using lethal force against a suspect and 
killing them. These capture operations can only be carried 
out on suspects that can lawfully be detained by the United 
States, and when the U.S.’s actions are permissible by law 
                                                 
9 Boyle, A. S. (2012). Contextualizing the Drones Debate. Scribd. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/102775947/Contextualizing-the-Drones-
Debate 
10 U.S. Policy Stardards and Procedures for the Use of Force in 
Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of 
Active Hostilities. (2013). WhiteHouse.gov. Retrieved from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/2013.05.23_fact
_sheet_on_ppg.pdf 
8th Edition 
73 
and align with the laws of other sovereign states.11 
 The next section of the policy standards and 
procedures document discusses the standards for using lethal 
forces in counterterrorism operations. It states that lethal 
force will only be used to stop or prevent attacks against a 
U.S. person only if capture is not possible. There are a few 
preconditions that need to be met before all lethal force 
attacks can operate. First, there must be a legal basis for 
using lethal force. Second, the target must pose an imminent, 
and constant threat to the U.S. or a U.S. citizen.  Not all 
terrorists pose a threat to the United States, therefore lethal 
measures cannot be used for just any person deemed a 
terrorist. Third, there are certain criteria that must be met 
before the use of lethal force. They include: almost complete 
certainty that the terrorist target is present and that no 
civilians or non-combatants will be injured, harmed, or 
killed, capture is not a possibility, the governmental 
authorities in the target state will not address the threat to the 
U.S. person and stop the threat, and there are no other 
reasonable alternatives beside lethal force to stop the threat 
on the U.S. person. Lastly, the United States must follow 
international law and respect national sovereignty, which 
constrains its ability to act unilaterally.12 
 The document also includes who make the decisions, 
                                                 
11 Preference for Capture. (2013). WhiteHouse.gov. Retrieved from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/2013.05.23_fact
_sheet_on_ppg.pdf 
12 Standards for the Use of Lethal Force. (2013). WhiteHouse.gov. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/2013.05.23_fact
_sheet_on_ppg.pdf 
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stating simply that the most senior levels of authority at the 
White House and other involved agencies will analyze the 
situation and decide with the help of the senior most 
attorneys.13 Other smaller notes on the document discuss 
how members of Congress that need to know about the 
counterterrorism operations are fully informed, and finally, 
the document has a reservation of authority. It reads that the 
standards and procedures in the document do not limit the 
President’s authority to take the necessary actions if and 
when “extraordinary circumstances” arise. As long as the 
President acts are necessary for the protection of the United 
States, while remaining lawful.14 
Analysis of Existing Policies  
 The U.S. military drone program has been effective 
in its mission to disrupt the terrorist networks planning to 
attack the U.S. or inflict harm to U.S. persons. The current 
policy has killed roughly 3,300 jihadist operatives that 
include members from the Taliban, al Qaeda, and others. 
This includes fifty plus senior level members of these 
terrorist organizations.15 Despite the major increase in drone 
                                                 
13 U.S. Government Coordination and Review. (2013). 
WhiteHouse.gov. Retrieved from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/2013.05.23_fact
_sheet_on_ppg.pdf 
14 Other Key Elements. (2013). WhiteHouse.gov. Retrieved from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/2013.05.23_fact
_sheet_on_ppg.pdf 
15 Byman, D. L. (2013). Why drones work: The case for Washington’s 
Weapon of Choice. Brookings. Retrieved from 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-
weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman 
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strikes since President Obama came into office, the U.S. 
military drone program are less expensive than any other 
traditional warfare tactic, with a major benefit of protecting 
American soldier’s lives.16 In fact, about $5 billion was used 
for drones in the 2012 Department of Defense budget,17 
which was approximately 1% of the total annual budget; this 
is a pretty low cost on account of how many insurgents have 
been targeted and killed using the program.18 Finally, drone 
strikes are, since 2001, legal acts that can be carried out by 
the President without having to go through Congress under 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). This 
bill states: “The President is authorized to use all necessary 
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the 
United States by such nations, organizations or person.” 19  
The notion of “all necessary and appropriate force” means 
drones are included in the bill. 
                                                 
16 Rohde, D. (n.d.). Are drones effective?. The Choices Program. 
[Video] Retrieved from http://www.choices.edu/resources/twtn/twtn-
drones.php 
17 Friends Committee on National Legislation. (2013). Understanding 
Drones. Fncl.org.  
18 Department of Defense. (2013). United States Department of 
Defense Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request. Retrieved from 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014
/FY2014_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf 
19 107th Congress. (2001). Authorization for use of military force. 
Public Law 107-40. Retrieved from 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf/PLAW-
107publ40.pdf 
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 Along with the drone programs effectiveness come 
some major draw-backs. First and foremost, there are 
supposedly a large number of civilians or non-combatants 
being killed by some of these drone strikes merely because 
they fit the description of act in “militant” ways or fit the 
terroristic profile.20 These numbers are estimated to be 
between 575 and 1,196 civilians killed21 The reason the 
numbers are so spread out leads into another problem with 
this program – there is little or no transparency, in which 
there is supposed to be. The Stimson task Force on U.S. 
Drone Policy did a report and graded the U.S. military drone 
policy.  In it they gave the grade of an “F” to the Obama 
Administration on the amount of information it released to 
the public. They called for more information on the number 
of strikes carried out by both the CIA and the military, the 
general location of the drone strikes, and the number killed, 
including the number of combatants, civilians, and even the 
identities of civilians known to have been killed.22  The U.S. 
policy has been accused of creating more terrorism than it 
has destroyed. The thought is that the bombing that are 
supposed to be killing the terrorists are harming citizens, 
creating a great resentment for the United States, along with 
                                                 
20 Currier, C., & Elliot, J. (2013). The drone war doctrine we still know 
nothing about. ProPublica. Retrieved from 
https://www.propublica.org/article/drone-war-doctrine-we-know-
nothing-about 
21 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. (2015). Get the data: Drone 
wars. Retrieved from 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drone
s-graphs/ 
22 Stohl, R. (2016). Grading progress on U.S. drone policy. Stimson. 
Retrieved from http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/grading-
progress-on-us-Drone-Policy.pdf 
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the terrorist organizations and leaders using the drone strikes 
to get sympathy from citizens. This anger and sympathy is 
allowing terrorist groups to recruit in larger numbers than 
before.23 24 Lastly, there is a long-term effect that could be 
troubling in the future. Under the rules that the United States 
is operating under now, if they view someone as being a 
terrorist and engaging in terrorist militant activities, they can 
attack. So what happens when the rest of the world’s drone 
programs catch up to the United States? If China has a drone 
flying over the United States, and identifies a person they 
view as committing terroristic actions against their country, 
they are legally allowed to bomb and kill them— if the U.S. 
and China are playing by the same rules.25 
 
Policy Options 
  
The first policy option would be to keep the drone 
program as is and use it whenever necessary.  It has proven 
to be effective in killing suspected terrorists involved in 
plotting against the United States, as well as dozens of senior 
level terrorist leaders.  They have disrupted terrorist 
                                                 
23 Raghavan, S. (2012). In Yemen, U.S. airstrikes breed anger, and 
sympathy for al-Qaeda. The Washington Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-yemen-us-
airstrikes-breed-anger-and-sympathy-for-al-
qaeda/2012/05/29/gJQAUmKI0U_story.html 
24 Scahill, J. (2012). Is U.S. counterterrorism fueling islamist militants 
in Yemen?. The Nation. Retrieved from 
http://www.thenation.com/article/washingtons-war-yemen-backfires/ 
25 Rohde, D. (n.d.). Why are drones controversial?. The Choices 
Program. [Video] Retrieved from 
http://www.choices.edu/resources/twtn/twtn-drones.php 
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networks and have effectively made it much more difficult 
for terrorist organizations to congregate into a location to 
plan attacks and other terroristic activities.26 Leaving the 
program go will leave the current and next POTUS the 
authority to call for a drone strike on any person that may be 
identified to be part of a terroristic organization or network.  
The same problems would be analyzed.   
 The next two policy options come in the form of 
transparency. The first of the two options is creating a 
stronger, non-partisan oversight committee or process.  This 
would make it slightly more difficult to proceed with a drone 
operation just because a person is displaying possible 
militant behaviors.  The second transparency option would 
be to go public about each strike, after the strike, giving 
justifications for the attack. This would make the agencies, 
the President, and other actors more accountable for the 
attacks that they call for. Such policy could lead to less drone 
strikes overall because of a greater chance or risk of backlash 
from the public. However, it would also damage the 
effectiveness of the program.  Not being able to conduct as 
many strikes could make the U.S. miss opportunities to kill 
real terrorists.27 
Another policy option is to develop a kind of “red 
team” for the decision making on drone strike operations. A 
                                                 
26 Debating U.S. Drone Policy. (n.d.). Option 1: Continue to Use 
Drones Whenever Needed. Retrieved from 
http://www.choices.edu/resources/twtn/documents/choices-twtn-
drones-options.pdf 
27 Fisher, M. (2013). 6 concrete policy ideas for fixing American’s 
drone dilemma. The Washington Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/02/06/6-
concrete-policy-ideas-for-fixing-americas-drone-dilemma/ 
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red team is a group of experts that would play a devil’s 
advocate role and offer other, possibly long-term options 
rather than the immediate bombing and killing of the 
suspected terrorist.  This could lead to more capturing 
techniques rather than just killing the suspected terrorist, 
meaning there would be more and better intelligence to work 
with in combatting terrorism. It would also make the process 
a little tougher, meaning there would be less strikes 
altogether. Again, this would lead to more accountable 
operators, but would risk the effectiveness of the program in 
disrupting terrorist networks working to terrorize the United 
States.28 
The final policy option is to get rid of the drone 
problem all together.  Many, possibly thousands of innocent 
civilians have been killed from being in the area where the 
bombs have been dropped. There have been civilians killed 
simply because they fit in with exploiting extremist 
behaviors.29 There have been four instances of U.S. citizens 
being killed from drone strike bombings.30 Under the 
Constitution, these suspected terrorists should have been 
given due process of law before being executed to determine 
                                                 
28 Fisher, M. (2013). 6 concrete policy ideas for fixing American’s 
drone dilemma. The Washington Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/02/06/6-
concrete-policy-ideas-for-fixing-americas-drone-dilemma/ 
29 Debating U.S. Drone Policy. (n.d.). Option 3: End Targeted Killings. 
Choices.edu. Retrieved from 
http://www.choices.edu/resources/twtn/documents/choices-twtn-
drones-options.pdf 
30 Matthews, D. (2013). Everything you need to know about the drone 
debate, in one FAQ. The Washington Post.  Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/03/08/everythin
g-you-need-to-know-about-the-drone-debate-in-one-faq/ 
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whether they were innocent or not. This policy would end 
the killings of innocent civilians through drone strikes. It 
would also mean sending on the ground troops to apprehend 
or kill a suspected terrorist, risking more American soldier’s 
lives. In the long run, it makes it easier for terrorist leaders 
to meet and plan invasions or attacks on the U.S. and other 
countries. 
 
Recommendation 
 
 I believe that the drone program is an invaluable tool. 
In the intelligence community, there are multiple forms of 
intelligence that is used to keep the United States safe. Some 
are human intelligence (HUMINT), image intelligence 
(IMGINT), etc.  Almost nothing is better at gathering 
IMGINT than the drones that we have flying now.  They 
protect the soldiers of the United States, and are one of the 
least expensive pieces of high-quality equipment that the 
U.S. uses in its war on terrorism. I would advocate for better 
transparency in the operations. This would, at the very least, 
make the administration able to be held accountable for the 
bombings. This may lead to less bombings overall, and will 
also decrease the amount of civilians killed because it will 
force the administration to more carefully evaluate the 
decision of whether to strike or not. According to the 
Stimson Task Force, more transparency would allow them 
to make better assessments of the program’s effectiveness 
and overall utility.31 In conclusion, I believe that the United 
                                                 
31 Stohl, R. (2016). Grading Progress on U.S. Drone Policy. Stimson 
Task Force. Retrieved from 
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States military drone program is a valuable tool, especially 
in the intelligence, counterintelligence and counterterrorism 
communities. I recommend a change in policy to make the 
operations more transparent to the public after the strikes, 
making the administration more accountable, while not 
jeopardizing the operations in its entirety.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/grading-progress-on-us-Drone-
Policy.pdf 
